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Glossary
Alcibiades ► Athenian general initially chosen to lead the Sicilian expedition. He was recalled from the
expedition and condemned to death by Athens, but he escaped to Sparta and helped them strategize against
Athens toward the end of the war.
Athens ► The leading democratic city-state in ancient Greece, of which Thucydides was a citizen.
Cleon ► Vengeful Athenian general and rival of Thucydides whom Thucydides consistently portrays in a
negative light.
Melian dialogue ► Diplomatic exchange presented by Thucydides in which Athenian ambassadors justify their
subsequent slaughter of the male population of the island of Melos.
Pericles ► Creator of the Athenian empire and the leader of democratic Athens at the beginning of the
Peloponnesian War.
Sparta ► (Lacadæmon) The leading aristocratic city-state in ancient Greece; the eventual victor in the
Peloponnesian War:
The Peloponnesian War ► A 27 year military conflict between Athens and Sparta that took place between 431
and 404 B.C.E.

T

hucydides (5th Century B.C.E.) is arguably the first
person to engage in systematic social measurement.
His lone surviving masterwork. The Peloponnesian War,
stands as a founding text for the disciplines of history
and political science. On its surface, The Peloponnesian
War comprehensively and objectively chronicles the 27
year military struggle between Athens and Sparta from
which the latter emerged victorious in 404 B.C.E. Yet
Thucydides’ aim and approach in recounting the Peloponnesian War is extensively debated, often reflecting enduring disagreements about the philosophy and
methodology of social science.

we do know that he was elected to the office of general
(strategos) in the eighth year of the war (424 B.C.E.) but
then exiled from Athens shortly thereafter (for failing
to prevent Sparta’s capture of the strategically important city ofAmphipolis). Thucydides also tells us that he
began work on his history at the war’s outset (11) and
lived through its entire 27 years (II 65, V 26). He did not,
however, live to complete the narrative, which breaks
off abruptly in the autumn of 411, the 21st year of the
conflict.

Overview of the Work
Thucydides the Person

Far from a single cohesive nation, ancient Greece in
the 5th century B.C.E. was composed of dozens of independent city-states (poleis). Most of these states were,
however, militarily subject to either Athens or Sparta,
the two great powers in Greece at the time. At its most
basic, therefore, the Peloponnesian War was a struggle
for regional hegemony between these two powers: Al-

We know little about Thucydides’ life beyond the
few things he tells us in The Peloponnesian War itself.
An Athenian citizen, Thucydides was probably born a
few years prior to 460 B.C.E., likely dying shortly after
the end of the Peloponnesian War. Perhaps significantly,
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though democratic Athens has exerted a greater influence on the thinking of Thucydides’ contemporary interpreters than has aristocratic Sparta, the latter of these
two powers was clearly the stronger at the war’s beginning. Indeed, as Thucydides tells us, most Greeks initially believed that the Spartans and their allies would
emerge victorious from the conflict within three years
(VII 28). Sparta’s obvious military superiority on land,
however, was offset by the supremacy of Athenian sea
power, which prolonged the war and left its outcome
uncertain until the fall of Athens and its empire.
Book I of Thucydides’ chronicle features a wideranging “Archaeology” of Greek society and politics
prior to the Peloponnesian War. As Thucydides recounts, the Athenians and Spartans had once been allies, forming the Hellenic League in 481 B.C. E. in order
to help all of Hellas rebuff a Persian invasion. Despite
major victories against their common enemy, relations
between the two powers were strained, eventually resulting in the withdrawal of Sparta to lead its prewar alliance, the Peloponnesian League. The Athenians in turn
created an alternative alliance, the Delian Confederacy,
which accepted Megara, a defecting member of the Peloponnesian League. War broke out between the two alliances in 460 and continued until 446, when both sides
accepted a peace treaty. The remainder of the narrative
commences with the broken peace of 431.
From the beginning of Book II through the beginning of Book V, Thucydides recounts the first, indecisive
phase of the conflict often called the Archidamian war.
While the Spartans regularly attacked the Attic countryside, the Athenians responded by ravaging the Peloponnesian coastline. In this 10-year period, the Athenians
also suffered a plague, intervened in Sicily, and routed
the Spartans at Pylos-Sphacteria; they subsequently lost
important holdings in battles near Thrace. This phase of
the war culminated with what was to be a 50-year peace
treaty, the Peace of Nicias, in 421.
The treaty, however, collapsed after only eight years
(many of which were actually spent in open dispute). In
415, the Athenians intervened a second time in Sicily, assisting their allies, the Egestaeans, and attempting to expand their empire through the conquest of Syracuse, the
preeminent Spartan ally in Sicily. The subject of Books
VI–VII, the so-called Sicilian war, ended with a crushing defeat for the Athenians. The effect of this defeat on
Athens was all the more pronounced because it coincided with the resumption of hostilities by the Spartans
and their allies closer to home. Facing Spartan troops
permanently based in the Attic countryside, an increasing number of subjects in revolt, and hostile naval forces
subsidized by their old enemy, Persia, the Athenians
were overmatched. Despite these unfavorable circumstances, this final phase of the conflict, the Ionian or Declean war, lasted another 10 years. It ended, however,
with the destruction of the Athenian navy in 405 and
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(after being starved into submission) the surrender of
Athens in 404.

Thucydidean Method
What exactly Thucydides hoped to achieve via his
history of the Peloponnesian War has been endlessly debated. Though some might make a claim for Herodotus,
the more rigorous Thucydides is generally considered
the inventor of descriptive history as such. Noting the
absence of “romance” in his narrative, Thucydides avers
that it might nonetheless “be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past (I,
22).” In turn, many have suggested that Thucydides’
aim is no more and no less than to provide an accurate
empirical description of the events that he recounts. Indeed, historians often remind us that Thucydides’ narrative contains an astounding volume of painstaking
detail, detail that Thucydides’ more social-scientifically
inclined readers may ignore at their peril. Yet while we
cannot underestimate the importance of Thucydides’ invention of comprehensive historical description, social
scientists are understandably drawn to the few “causal”
or “explanatory” claims that he appears to be making
throughout the work.
Perhaps the most significant of these claims is Thucydides’ famous comment about why the Peloponnesian
War began: “The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedæmon, made war
inevitable” (I, 23). At first blush, this passage seems to
imply that Thucydides possesses a broadly “materialist” view of empirical causation. Specifically, he seems
to suggest that the onset of the Peloponnesian War is
fully explained by the existence of a single, concrete and
observable variable: namely, increasing Athenian power.
To be sure, many have noted that an accurate measurement of Athenian power proves elusive. In discussing
the Peloponnesian War, as in other cases, debate among
international relations scholars and military strategists
abounds with disagreements over the degrees to which,
e.g., population, wealth, geography, and munitions determine a state’s “military capabilities,” and, in turn,
over whether it is “absolute” or “relative” military capabilities that are most significant.
More important, however, this single sentence of
The Peloponnesian War is characteristic of Thucydides’
occasional “editorial” statements in that it has likewise
spawned more radical disagreement among his interpreters. Specifically, numerous scholars have noted
that the most proximate cause of the war mentioned
by Thucydides is not the material change in Athenian
power, but rather, the more “ideational” variable of fear
or “alarm” that this change inspired in Sparta. In other
words, debate over this passage closely reflects debate between idealist and materialist approaches to so-
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cial science in general (as evidenced most famously via
Marx’s methodological critique of Hegel). Indeed, generation after generation of philosophers of social science
have claimed a methodological pedigree from Thucydides. Contemporary constructivist and postmodernist
scholars, for example, argue that the onset of the Peloponnesian War is explained by the breakdown of social and diplomatic discourses in 5th Century Hellas. In
point of fact, however, debate over Thucydides’ account
of the onset of the Peloponnesian War provides only
one example of how arguments about Thucydides reflect broader debates about social measurement. If anything, Thucydides’ incomplete account of the outcome
of the Peloponnesian war—that is, his account of why
Athens loses—has proven still more suggestive to those
interested in social-scientific theory and method.
As noted, a purely materialist account of Athens’
defeat in the war is by no means difficult to construct.
If we attend simply to the balance of power between
the Spartan and Athenian sides, the fact that Athens
avoided defeat as long as it did is arguably the greater
mystery. Understandably, however, the balance of military power between the two sides is by no means the
only variable that scholars have noted as contributing to
the war’s eventual outcome.
Many of Thucydides’ interpreters, for example,
stress the critical role in the conflict played by individual Athenian leaders. The charismatic Pericles is seen as
crucial to Athens’ initial pursuit of empire, the vengeful Cleon blamed for the subsequent alienation of her
subject states, the perplexing Alcibiades alternately celebrated and condemned for his role in the initiation
and execution of the Sicilian expedition. Despite the no
doubt significant role played by these individual citizens, however, a still more common mode of explaining
Athens’ defeat centers on the political context in which
they came to power: namely, as leaders of the Athenian
democracy. Even the most prominent defenders of the
benefits of democracy in the conduct of foreign policy,
including Michael Doyle, note that the experience of
Athens during the war casts the demos in a not entirely
favorable light: “It is here, in Thucydides’ History, that
democracy first acquired its reputation for such disastrous factionalism” (79). In Athens, of course, the demos
exercised much more direct control over foreign policy
than it does in representative democracies today. Moreover, even insofar as it delegated some of this authority
to the elected strategoi, Thucydides notes that the most
jingoistic of these Athenian generals, such as Cleon,
were often successful in appealing to what he seems to
have regarded as the lowest common denominator of
popular support.
We return to the question of Thucydides’ moral
stance in regard to the Athenian polity and its foreign
policy in a moment. At present, it is enough to note that
The Peloponnesian War raises many of the classic causal
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questions about whether a state’s system of government
influences its foreign policy: Advocates of the “democratic peace” proposition, for example (sometimes called
the one “iron law” of contemporary international relations scholarship) argue that even if Athens was bellicose in its relations with Sparta and other autocracies,
it avoided conflict with democratic states. In contrast,
those who see democracies as possessing a particularly
pronounced tendency for the foolish overextension of
empire have likewise found an early cautionary tale in
Athens. Last but not least, scholars intrigued by the fact
that modern democracies rarely lose the wars they enter—the so-called “powerful pacifists” hypothesis—look
back to the counterexample of Athens in hopes of determining whether anything inherent in democracy predicts its military success.
Yet is it appropriate for scholars to cavort across the
millennia in search of universal social-scientific laws? Is
not everything that Thucydides says about democracy
and foreign policy so wrapped up in a bygone social context that to try and apply it to today’s world constitutes
a fateful hubris? To argue as much is certainly credible,
but, to claim that Thucydides himself would have made
this argument strikes us as less so. For just as he can be
claimed as the inventor of “ideographic” methods and
“thick description,” so too can Thucydides be noted as
the first researcher to possess a universalizing or “nomothetic” urge. He makes this evident, of course, in telling us that “the future … in the course of human things
must resemble if it does not reflect [the past],” and in
turn that, “In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as
a possession for all time” (122). It is this justly famous
remark, perhaps, that constitutes Thucydides’ most important and controversial contribution to the history of
social measurement.

Measurement and Morality
Even if Thucydides is attracted to the project of a nomothetic social science, however, this as yet tells us nothing about how this may or may not comport with his
other aims in writing The Peloponnesian War. He is, after
all, read far less by methodologists than he is by political theorists, and apart from the question of his empirical aims stands the question of what, if any, moral lesson he wishes us to take from the narrative. Asking this
question is interesting for various reasons. First, there is
the possibility that Thucydides displays normative bias
in recounting the events of the war, leading us to think
twice about his status as an objective historian and social scientist. Alternatively, it could be that Thucydides
felt that even an unbiased presentation of the facts of
the war would lead the reader to certain moral or ethical conclusions. But just what are Thucydides’ moral
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and ethical commitments, if any? Many readers have
seen Thucydides as the father of realpolitik, that is, of the
view that morality and politics are incompatible. Such
an ethos was, to be sure, frequently articulated in ancient Greece, as, for example, by some of Socrates’ more
famous interlocutors. In Thucydides, realpolitik is most
clearly defended by the Athenian ambassadors to Melos. For various reasons, however, most scholars now
aver that Thucydides is little more sympathetic to these
ambassadors than is Plato sympathetic to, e.g., Thrasymachus or Callicles.
While the preceding section discussed the claim that
Sparta began the war out of fear, Thucydides also notes
that the Spartans were compelled by the Corinthians to
oppose Athenian injustices at Potidæa (I, 71). The Athenians, for their part, argued that they were obligated to
acquire and expand their empire out of fear of external
threats, despite the knowledge that to do so would result in widespread opprobrium. In addition to this line
of thought, they also suggested that “honour and interest afterwards came in” (I, 75). These claims, in addition
to the Athenian assertion that they are uniquely entitled
to rule others, serve as the ground upon which Thucydides bases his discussion of Athens.
The most famous defense of the ethical underpinnings of Athenian war aims comes from Pericles, in an
oration for the war’s first fallen soldiers. He encourages
the Athenians to love their city as the soldiers have and
to be ready to make the same sacrifice should they be
called on to do so (II, 43). Athens, he says, is so beautiful and noble as to inspire love among its citizens, not
merely because it is powerful but also because it acts for
reasons beyond self-interest (either individual or collective). Arguably, however, this still falls well short of acting justly. As David Bolotin points out, Pericles “boasts
that Athens has everywhere established everlasting memorials of evils as well as goods … And when he speaks
of everlasting memorials of evils and goods, he has in
mind the evils that Athens has suffered as well as the
harm it has done to others” (20).
While Pericles may exaggerate the virtues of the
Athenian people, Thucydides himself is often critical of
the city in the post-Periclean era. At times, to be sure,
Thucydides clearly approves of the workings of Athenian democracy. After a lengthy siege succeeded in
crushing a rebellion at Mytilene, the Athenians initially
determined that all the male citizens should be punished with death, and the women and children sold into
slavery (III, 36). A day after dispatching a ship to deliver
the order, however, they experienced a change of heart
and Thucydides gives a lengthy recounting of their second debate, with speeches by his perennial rival Cleon,
who favored the original decree, and Diodotus, who opposed it. In the end, the Athenians adopted the position of Diodotus and hastily sent a second ship to prevent the original order from being carried out (III, 49).
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As Michael Walzer observes, “It is the appeal to interest
that triumphs—as has often been pointed out—though
it should be remembered that the occasion for the appeal was the repentance of the citizens. Moral anxiety,
not political calculation, leads them to worry about the
effectiveness of their decree” (9).
In stark contrast, Thucydides provides no account of
any democratic process leading to the decision to attack
the island of Melos and, ultimately, to kill its male citizens and enslave its women and children. Unlike Mytilene, a former ally of Athens that rebelled and joined
the Spartans, Melos had chosen to remain neutral until
the Athenians violently encroached on their territory (V,
84). All that is recorded, this time, is the exchange between the Athenian generals, Cleomedes and Tisias, and
the Melian representatives prior to the official outbreak
of hostilities. Here, the Athenians remove the notion of
justice from the discussion at the very outset:
For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences—either of how we have a right to
our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are
now attacking you because of wrong that you have
done us—and make a long speech which would
not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you
did not join the Lacedæmonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at
what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments
of us both; for you know as well as we do that right,
as the world goes, is in question only between equals
in power, while the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must (V, 89).

In the end, the Melians chose not to subject themselves to Athens and were besieged. After months of
fighting, Melos was betrayed by a number of its citizens
and yielded to the Athenians, who put to death all the
men, and sold the women and children into slavery (V,
116). According to Walzer, “We are to understand that
Athens is no longer itself. Cleomedes and Tisias do not
represent that noble people who fought the Persians in
the name of freedom. … They represent instead the imperial decadence of the city state” (7). Whether or not
the potential for imperial overreach was always present
in Athenian democracy, however, it is eventually this
imperial impulse that carries the day, ultimately leading
to the ill-fated Sicilian expedition.
What did Thucydides himself think of Athenian imperialism and this final campaign to extend it? Thucydides clearly does not possess the outright aversion to
imperialism that Walzer and most of the rest of us do
today. He presents Pericles, the father of Athenian empire, in a highly favorable light, and various commentators note grounds on which the Athenian empire would
have been viewed as a progressive enterprise at the time.
(It is, for example, generally agreed that the limited de-
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mocracy brought by Athenian rule was embraced by
the lower classes in her subject cities.) Even if this is the
case, however, it is unclear that Thucydides himself was
sufficiently fond of the political system of post-Periclean
Athens to advocate its export to other Greek states.
In any case, a quite different account of Thucydides’
stance regarding Athenian imperialism suggests that he
actually condemns it for being too hesitant. This reading centers upon the mysterious destruction of the city’s
statues of Hermae that occurred just prior to the Sicilian expedition. The expedition was decided upon at a
time of great factional conflict within Athens, and citizens sympathetic to Alcibiades, the brilliant general
chosen to lead the expedition, were widely blamed for
the statues’ destruction. Eventually, this led to Alcibiades being stripped of his post. Thomas Pangle and Peter Ahrensdorf, among others, argue that the expedition
might have succeeded were it not for this strange turn of
events: “According to Thucydides, the Athenians could
have conquered Sicily, and consequently could have
won the war, if only they had retained the services of
Alcibiades” (26).
Such a reading returns us to a view of Thucydides as
an advocate of realpolitik. That is, rather than responding
to the mutilation of the Hermae with the cool rationality
that Thucydides, it is argued, himself recommends, the
Athenians took drastic action in the face of a religious
crime that they also interpreted as a sign of divine displeasure with their imperial ambition. “It would seem,”
Pangle and Ahrensdorf argue, “that the Athenians interpret the mutilation of the Hermae not in the light of
their own argument on justice and self-interest but in
the light of their suspicion or fear that they are guilty of
injustice” (27–28). Like much else in Thucydides, however, the suggestion that he sympathizes with Alcibiades is controversial: Alcibiades is likewise responsible
for undoing the Peace of Nicias, and Nicias is perhaps
the only figure for, whom Thucydides expresses even
greater personal fondness. Commenting on his “unwarranted butchering” during the war, Thucydides remarks
that “of all the Hellenes in my time, [Nicias] least deserved this fate, seeing that the whole course of his life
had been regulated with strict attention to virtue” (VII,
86).
Many scholars thus point to Thucydides’ remark
about Nicias, among other passages, as evidence that he
views war as fundamentally tragic. While it would be
a stretch to view Thucydides as a thoroughgoing pacifist, a case can certainly be made that he came to see
the Peloponnesian War as a mistake—not just for Athens, but for all of Greece. Such a view is perhaps most
strongly evidenced in Thucydides’ discussion of prewar
Hellenic society and politics at the beginning of Book I.
For here, Thucydides speaks less of Athens and Sparta
than he does of the Pan-Hellenic “country” (I, 2) and
“race” (I, 1). Indeed, on more than one occasion, Thucy-
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dides seems to regret the fact that, except for during the
war against Persia, the states of Greater Hellas proved
“incapable of combination for great and national ends”
(I, 15), much less of uniting in “a spontaneous combination of equals” (I, 16). While hardly a contemporary
global citizen, then, it would seem that Thucydides is,
like Socrates, drawn to the Pan-Hellenic ideal of cooperation and perhaps even confederation among Greek
states (an ideal by no means uncommon in his time).
Viewed from this perspective, The Peloponnesian War
becomes a tragic story indeed, one in which an unwarranted and essentially “civil” conflict slowly engulfs a
divided Hellas.

Conclusion
Obviously, we will never know exactly what sort of
justice, if any, Thucydides felt that his native Athens
owed to the rest of Greece and the world beyond. Nor,
for that matter, will we know in what sense, if any, he
thought it inevitable that states powerful enough to engage in hegemonic war will do so. We should, perhaps,
take seriously the possibility that Thucydides changed
his views of these issues while writing a very long narrative about a very long conflict. In any event, not only
the diverse ethical thinking that Thucydides has inspired but also the numerous methods that he introduced to social measurement will continue to prove important gifts to posterity.
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